This paper presents an analysis of the finances of Egyptian listed companies evaluating recent trends in growth and profitability during the 1995-2001 period. The data from financial statements reveal the effect of the economic slowing of the past few years, especially in the construction and real estate sectors and especially in smaller companies. We find that smaller firms appear to be less profitable and enjoy lower growth, likely because of being particularly adversely affected by many of the sources of the high costs of doing business in Egypt. While the Egyptian firms are not very highly leveraged on average, we find that smaller firms have significantly less access to bank finance than larger firms do. This confirms the widely held view that there is a need to improve the availability of credit for small enterprises.
Introduction
One of the main roles of the financial sector is allocation of financial resources to their most productive uses. Financial intermediaries play a crucial role in providing funds to the enterprise sector and stimulating its growth. To date, Egypt's success in penetrating international markets for manufactures has been disappointing as has its low growth in total factor productivity.
2 Government policies distorting the allocation of resources (including the export-harming structure of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade as well as inefficiencies and misallocations through the public sector banks) are thought to be primarily responsible for this disappointing record; however, deficient financial infrastructure also points clearly to the need for examining the arrangements for financing the enterprise sector. Facilitating access to finance by the enterprise sector and especially small and medium enterprises should improve productivity and growth in Egypt.
This paper presents an analysis of the finances of Egyptian listed companies evaluating recent trends in growth and profitability and the effects of the economic slowdown of recent years. The data from financial statements (available up to year 2000) reveal the effect of the economic slowing of the past few years, especially in the construction and real estate sectors and especially in smaller companies. Smaller firms appear to be less profitable and enjoy lower growth, likely because of being particularly adversely affected by many of the sources of the high costs of doing business in Egypt. Egyptian firms are not very highly leveraged, on average. While this may reduce their vulnerability, it raises questions about the adequacy of access to credit. Importantly, smaller firms rely much less on bank finance than do larger ones, financing 40 percent less of their assets in this way. It is likely that these differences are even more pronounced for non-listed small and micro enterprises.
This confirms the widely held view that there is a need to improve the availability of credit for small enterprises.
2 Non-resource based manufacturing exports account for barely 1 percent of GDP. A standard growth decomposition attributes two-thirds of Egypt's growth 1995-2000 to physical capital accumulation; one-third to human-capital adjusted labor, and essentially nothing to total factor productivity growth (cf. World Bank: Egypt: Social and Structural Review, 2001 ).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following sections: Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 reports on the international comparison of key financial ratios, Section 4 provides the analysis of financial ratios by year, Section 5 presents industry composition and trend in sales growth by industry, Section 6 presents analysis of financial ratios by firm size, Section 7 presents analysis of key ratios by leverage and size, Section 8 reports the results of regression analysis of the leverage ratios, Section 9 discusses capital market liquidity and concentration and Section 10 presents summary of results.
Data
The data were obtained from the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and include An important adjustment has been made to reported accounts in order to carry out the analysis. This is required because most firms continue to report fixed assets (PPE-property plant and equipment) at their gross values without deduction of any allowance for depreciation. (This is the case even though Egyptian accounting standards have been changed to comply with IAS, which requires reporting fixed assets at their net value, i.e., subtracting accumulated depreciation from gross assets). This creates a distorted picture of the true value of the assets: as fixed assets age their replacement value declines and therefore the "economic" value of the total assets should decline. By recording the PPE at gross value, the book value of the total assets might be constant (or even increasing) even if the true (economic) value were declining. To adjust for this the team estimated the net value of fixed assets by subtracting accumulated depreciation, which will also allow easy comparison with similar ratios for other countries. In calculating total assets the team used the net-ofdepreciation values for fixed assets. The adjustment gives quite a different picture: for example, the level of net total assets is quite stable over time (in contrast to the gross figure for total assets which grows at about 5 percent a year, on average). Table 1 reports the main corporate financial ratios for Egypt and for listed firms in a sample of developing and developed countries (obtained from the Worldscope database).
International Comparison of Key Financial Ratios
Since year 1999 is the most represented in both datasets, it is chosen as a benchmark for comparison.
Profitability of Egyptian firms in 1999 was broadly in line with international experience. The profitability ratios (both operating income and net income) are the same or slightly lower than the average for other countries shown.
Leverage in Egypt is lower than in most other countries in the sample. The ratio of total liabilities to total assets has a median of 0.51 for Egypt while the world median is 0.57.
The lower leverage ratio in Egypt suggests that Egyptian firms may face some difficulties in raising debt finance. Furthermore, the interest coverage ratio (the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT, over the interest payments) is 2.79, which is much higher than the world median of 1.77. This suggests that the firms in Egypt could service more debt than they have.
The most striking difference is in the comparison of the ratio of current liabilities over total liabilities. The ratio of 0.99 suggests that the median firm in Egypt in 1999 has almost no long-term debt, while the median ratio over all other countries is 0.74, representing a much smaller portion of the total liabilities. This suggests that firms in Egypt are constrained in their access to long-term debt (i.e., with maturity of over one year). The limited availability of long-term financing is one of the frequently mentioned constraint in informal surveys of the private sector.
The ratio of retained earnings to total assets is much lower in Egypt than in other countries. This result is in contrast with comparison of profitability ratios, which are similar Table 2 contains key ratios for Egyptian firms by year. Several clear patterns stand out in this analysis. First, the growth rate of sales is clearly declining over this period and the median real growth rate (i.e., inflation adjusted) turns negative in 1998 and declines even further in subsequent years. The declines in profitability (both net income and operating income are declining) parallel declines in sales growth. Low profitability also results in low additions to retained earnings-the percent of assets financed by retained earnings is also clearly declining. All these ratios are significantly lower in 2000 than in 1996 (significance is at 1 percent for sales growth and net income and at 15 percent for operating income and retained earnings). 4 The market valuations parallel these performance results with steadily declining Q-values (significant at 1 percent). These results suggest that the decline in the corporate sector is not a recent phenomenon and was persistent for at least last four years (starting in 1998).
Analysis of Financial Ratios by Year
Low profitability could in principle result in increased demand for borrowing from distressed firms. On the other hand it reduces the creditworthiness of firms and their capacity to service debt. In the case of Egypt, the declining profitability has been associated with a reduction in leverage. Analysis of the financing patterns reveals visible and statistically significant declining leverage ratios whether measured as debt to equity or total liabilities over total assets. 5 This suggests that in more recent years firms were less able to obtain debt financing (this could be either because such financing was not available or was only available at too high a cost). This is in line with reports of a liquidity squeeze often mentioned during interviews the team had with enterprises. As a result of the low overall level of indebtedness, the interest coverage ratios are relatively high and stable over time (the change is not significant). On one side this suggests that the debt levels are manageable (at least for the median firm), but on the other side it suggests that many firms might be able to afford more leverage than they currently have, potentially allowing more investment and faster growth.
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Another clearly visible problem is the maturity structure of the liabilities-the mean ratio of current liabilities over total liabilities is around 85 percent and the median firm has almost no long-term liabilities (defined as liabilities with more than one year maturity). This clearly reflects the underdevelopment of the long-term credit markets. The situation has not changed much in the last five years and the ratios are very stable over time. Over-reliance on short-term liabilities could become a source of potential instability in the corporate sector, as firms could be faced with a significant shortage of financing if creditors suddenly become unwilling to roll-over the debt.
Analysis of asset composition reveals that while gross fixed assets are growing, net assets are relatively stable, which suggests that the companies only undertook replacement investment, absorbing only the depreciation allowances and making no net addition to the stock of fixed assets. The cash stocks carried by firms were declining, which is likely to be another indication of the overall liquidity squeeze. 
Industry Composition and Trend in Sales by Industry

Analysis of Financial Ratios by Firm Size
This section analyzes performance and financing patterns for firms of different sizes.
The Firms in the database are split into three size groups based on their nominal sales. The groups are based on an equal three-way partition of the number of firms ordered by size (33 rd and 66 th percentiles). These groups designated as Smaller, Medium and Large, but this classification is relative-i.e., the firms classified as part of the Smaller group are not technically small enterprises-they are merely the smallest firms in the sample. The Smaller group has sales below LE 11.6 million and the Medium group has sales below LE 66.5 million. Table 5 reports the medians for key ratios for 3 groups of firms and Table 6 reports the time trends by the firm size. Several patterns stand out of this analysis. First, median sales growth and profitability is significantly lower for the Medium and especially for the Smaller firms. This is true for averages across all periods (Table 5 ) and for the degree of decline (Table 6) , which is much more pronounced for the Smaller group relative to both Medium and Large groups.
Median growth for the Smaller group was about 1 percent in 1996 and declined to negative 10 percent in 2000 (however, because of heterogeneity among firms the difference between the two years is only significant at the 15 percent level). Large firms were growing at a median rate of 10 percent in 1996, but had a median growth of negative 1 percent in 2000 (the difference between the two years is significant at 1 percent).
The profitability and retained earnings also declined significantly for the Smaller firms, while staying the same or even increasing for the Large firms. The big disparity in these trends highlights the weak condition of many small firms, which has further deteriorated in recent years. Note that the condition of-even smaller-firms that are not listed on the stock exchange could be even worse.
The leverage patterns are also clearly differ by size-the Smaller group has significantly lower debt to equity and total liabilities to total assets ratios, which suggests that they are having relatively more problems with accessing debt finance. However, the leverage ratios of all three groups of firms have declined. Total liabilities have declined by about 10 percentage points (of total assets) in all three groups, but as a percent of the starting value this decline is larger for the Smaller group. 7 Because of falling profitability the coverage ratios have also declined for all three groups, but the only statistically significant decline was for the Smaller group. This suggest that the Smaller firms are limited in their access to credit partly because of their low and declining earnings, which makes them less likely to be able to meet interest payments. In other words, the lower levels of debt finance may be a result of low profitability, suggesting that-to this extent-the banks do make the right choices in the selection of credit-worthy clients. Further evidence is provided on this point in the regression analysis reported below. However, the low and declining earnings in Smaller firms is a source of concern that requires additional investigation. If the trend were to continue, many of the Smaller enterprises would not be viable. This is a worrying picture and may be mirrored in-or even worse in-the rest of (non-listed) corporate sector.
Reliance on long-term finance is significantly lower for the Smaller and Medium size firms and the median firms in both groups have almost zero long-term liabilities. It seems that only a few Large firms are able to obtain long-term debt. These ratios are very stable over time with no significant changes.
Paid-in capital as a share of total assets is much larger for Smaller firms and is increasing over time. This suggests that most of the financing for Smaller firms comes from the funds of their owners; another indication of their limited access to external finance. This may have been a tax-driven phenomenon. The increase is the largest for the Smaller firms (increased from 0.36 to 0.53), while it is the smallest for the Large firms (from 0.14 to 0.19).
Finally, the market-to-book values ratios are much lower for the Smaller and Medium firms. In addition, for these groups the Q ratios are very close to one, which implies that the market value of equity is equal to the book value of equity. This equivalence could well reflect a mechanical use of book value for setting the price at which the occasional transactions, required to qualify for maintenance of the listing; if so, there is no informational value in the market price of such firms. Table 7 contains several key performance ratios for both size and leverage groups.
Analysis of Key Ratios by Leverage and Size Groups
These data confirm the previous results that Smaller firms are performing worse than the Medium and Large firms in terms of all performance ratios considered in this table-sales growth, operating income and interest coverage. However, Smaller firms that in addition are highly leveraged are significantly more worse off than the average Smaller firm. The Large firms are significantly better off than the other two groups (highest sales growth and operating income), however, within the Large group the worst performers (in terms of sales growth, operating income and interest coverage ratios) are firms with the highest leverage.
The largest firms have higher market values in each of the leverage group. But it appears that the market gives the highest valuations to the moderately leveraged Large firms (i.e., medium leverage group). It could be that the market is cautious about highly leveraged firms inasmuch as they may be facing debt distress. If so, the market is, to some extent distinguishing the better-performing firms, which is definitely a positive sign.
Regression Analysis of the Leverage Ratios
Bivariate relationships reported above could be misleading in that they could be entirely driven by correlations with omitted variables. For example, the lower leverage of small firms might truly be associated with their low profitability on average and not really with their size.
Multiple regression analysis allows us to check for such potential complications. Table 8 presents results of selected regressions with the ratio of total liabilities over total assets as a dependent variable.
The regression confirms the patterns reported earlier and we find that each of the bivariate relationships reported is confirmed. In particular, the dummy variables for Smaller and Medium groups (using the same cutoff points as above) are significantly negative, indicating that these groups have less leverage than the Large group. The coefficients imply that controlling for time and industry effect the Smaller group has on average 18 percent less liabilities (as percent of the total assets) than the Large group, while the Medium group has about 8 percent less.
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The year dummies show the familiar negative trend, which becomes significant in years 1998
and 1999. The industries with the most leverage are the construction (always highly significant) and textiles and the lowest leverage is in the non-real estate finance group (note that there are no banks in this group and it mainly represents brokerages, insurance and holding companies). Sales growth is not significantly related to leverage (model 2) while operating performance is negatively related to leverage. This suggests that firms with lower operating performance have higher leverage. This link is mostly mechanical as firms making losses erode their equity and therefore increase their leverage. The effect of operating performance on the growth in level of total liabilities is not significant (not reported). In model 3 we interact the size dummies with a time trend and find that while the Large firms have experienced significant decline in their leverage (equal to about 1.1 percent per year), the Smaller firms have experienced significantly larger declines (equal to about 2.5 percent per year), while Medium group is not significantly different from the Large group.
Capital Market Liquidity and Concentration
This section provides further discussion of the data on equity prices and volume traded. A brief look at the trading patterns reveals that for many of the listed securities, the 8 The trend variable replaces time dummies in this regression. It equals to one in the first year and increases by increment of one in each subsequent year. The trend-size interaction shows the differential effect of the trend on the firms in small and medium groups relative to the trend for the large group (which is given by trend variable without interaction).
trades are rather artificial. For example, there are many firms that trade the same number of shares (which usually is a round number such as 100 or 1,000) for several years in a row and the shares have the same price (again, very often a round number, 100 and 1,000 are very common). The reason for such artificial trading patterns is obvious-the CMA has a rule that requires delisting any firm that has not been traded for more than six months. However, this requirement could be satisfied by trades by firm insiders, which may be regarded as "cosmetic" trading.
To evaluate the extent of such trading behavior an indicator of "cosmetic trading"
was created. 9 The percentage of all firms that are either not traded at all or traded only in a "cosmetic" way is reported in Figure 1 Table 9 reports total market capitalization and total value traded, together with percentage of "cosmetic" and "traded" firms (note that these numbers are calculated for the whole universe of the listed firms). The total market capitalization was increasing until 1999 (likely as a result of adding new listings) after which is started to decline reflecting overall declines in the market valuations. The value traded also reached a peak in 1999 and To further assess liquidity in the market, Table 10 One potential reason could be that it is assumed here that the total number of shares is the same for all years-but the firms could issue additional shares or repurchase their shares or do a split. Unfortunately the CME does not keep the historical number of shares, and the team recommended collecting these data for the future research purposes.
clear that the market is becoming less concentrated but the concentration ratios are still very high.
The value traded is even more concentrated than market capitalization with 10 most To summarize this section, the stock market in Egypt is very concentrated with many firms either not traded or traded cosmetically. Most of the trading is done in a very few firms (most trading is in the largest 100 firms). The concentration and liquidity ratios are improving very slowly.
Summary of Results
This paper examines financial statements of listed Egyptian enterprises. It provides evidence on how enterprises are financed, and analyses their profitability and growth. In considering the findings, it should be noted that, because of the tax and other advantages of listing, the population of listed companies likely represents a larger share of the enterprise sector in Egypt than in many other developing countries. The main findings are summarized below:
• Listed firms are not highly leveraged on average by international standards and indeed median leverage declined in the period 1995-2000. The number of firms with a debt/equity ratio in excess of 200 percent at end-2000 is 48 and they account for 14 percent of the total firms with non-missing data for debt and equity. The stock figures do not, therefore, point to any evident systemic vulnerability from excessive corporate leverage.
• Nevertheless, the recent decline in overall economic growth is clearly reflected in the deteriorating growth and performance of the listed firms. It appears that small firms have suffered the largest declines in their growth rates and profitability. In terms of industrial composition, the construction and the real-estate financing sectors were hit the hardest by the crisis with over 20 percent nominal declines in year 2000.
• The analysis also suggests that small firms have particular difficulty accessing debt finance, with low and declining leverage ratios in recent years. No doubt this is partly the result of low prospective profitability of the small firms, which in turn is likely to be related to the institutional factors and excessive costs of doing business in Egypt.
• In addition, access to long-maturity debt is severely limited among all firms but even more so for smaller firms.
• The stock market in Egypt is very concentrated with many firms either not traded or traded cosmetically. Most of the trading is done in a very few firms (most trading is in the largest 100 firms). The concentration and liquidity ratios are improving very slowly. Source: Egypt-CMA data (own calculations), other countries-Worldscope. Reported are medians. TA stands for total Assets. Tobin's Q is defined as market value of equity +book value of liabilities over total assets. Interest coverage is defined as earnings before interest and taxes over interest payments. Source: CMA data (own calculations). TA stands for total assets. Tobin's Q is defined as market value of equity + book value of liabilities over total assets. Real Sales Growth is sales growth adjusted for inflation (obtained from WDI). Interest coverage is defined as earnings before interest and taxes over interest payments. Gross PPE is property plan and equipment (i.e., fixed assets) at purchase cost, net PPE excludes accumulated depreciation. The t-test indicates significance for equality of the medians (or means) between years 1996 and 2000. ***,**,*, and a indicate significance at 1 percent,5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. Notes: Source CMA (own calculations). Dependent variable is total liabilities over total assets. Small and medium are dummies variable for firms in the smallest and medium thirds. Trend is a time trend equal to zero and 1995 and increasing by one for each subsequent year. The asterisks report t-tests for coefficient significance: ***,** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
